4th Year
Is war between China and the United States inevitable? Explain your answer with reference to at least one international relations theory.
The conflict between the United States and China has been framed as ‘inevitable’ by realist theories of international politics. The course of the last century has included vast political transformations across multiple countries, primarily in the United States and the USSR during the Cold War, and the subsequent collapse of the USSR, which reshaped the global order. The emergence of America as a global superpower was a result of World War II, as the “US has positioned itself as the leader of the international order” (Adams 2018, p.69). The USSR’s collapse and the end of the Cold War in 1991 cemented the US’s international supremacy. Further, China’s integration into the global economy, which accelerated significantly during the Global Financial Crisis, reinforced its emergence as a global superpower challenging US dominance. Within contemporary international relations theory, the US is understood as the status quo superpower.
A central theory regarding international politics and relations is realism, and its branch, neorealism. Realism holds that international relations are anarchic and that there is no global governance; nation-states are the primary actors pursuing power, security and survival, establishing that conflict is structurally likely but not predetermined. Neorealism describes that nation-state behaviour within the international system is anarchic, with systemic pressures and power distribution being central. Realist international theory holds that conflict is likely and persistent, as nation-states seek to secure their sovereignty. Realism, therefore, hypothesises that the US-China conflict is probable, as both sovereign states seek military power to secure their interests. Adams states that “For decades, policymakers in Washington have characterised the U.S as the inevitable leader of the global system and the guarantor of stability and power” (Adams 2018, p.70).
The decline of Western dominance and its co-occurring power transition towards Chinese dominance is central to international politics and relations. Western dominance is eroding, and whilst US military dominance is still prevalent, the advancement of other countries, such as China, is significant. Realism is robust in this situation as it focuses on relative power shifts rather than absolute weaknesses. The decline of US dominance is widely observed, yet its hegemony across nation-states remains powerful. The decrease in US dominance is primarily attributed to the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis, which originated in the United States and Europe, leading to reduced confidence and exposing flaws in Western capitalism. The distinction between the US and China’s political and economic ideologies saw China recover much faster than the US from the Global Financial Crisis. Their financial system was less exposed to Western financial markets, and the reduced interest in Western interests meant they were vastly less affected. The economic growth of Chinese capital and the stagnation of Western economies led to the relative decline of the US and the rise of China. The GFC, therefore, accelerated Chinese military modernisation and infrastructure development. While we see stagnation in Western democracies, particularly in America, the Chinese economy and political infrastructure have seen a relative increase, essential to China’s status as a superpower, with “The West’s centuries-long domination of world affairs is now coming to a close” (Adams 2018, p. 70).
China’s economic and political transformation began with reforms in 1978, whilst the GFC was a powerful landmark. China’s rise began with economic reform, as it experienced sustained, prolonged economic growth due to state-led planning and strategic advances. Manufacturing, exports, and infrastructure mainly drive China’s economic growth. China’s economic growth has been accompanied by military modernisation; increased funding for naval, missile, and air operations has created tension in the Asia-Pacific region with American interests, with Cimbala stating, “China’s military modernisation is going to change the distribution of power in Asia” (Cimbala 2015, p. 11). China’s increased military presence across the Asia Pacific challenges US alliances, triggering a power transition in the region. The regional balance of power between the US and China in the Asia-Pacific is to prevent China from gaining dominance in the region, whilst protecting US allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia from military threats and preserving trade routes, with a fundamental core of avoiding a regional hegemon. The shifting regional balance of power and the heightened insecurity the US faces make the Thucydides trap theory important.
Thucydides’ Trap highlights the dangers that arise when a rising power challenges the established global hegemon. Winkler (2023, p.333) states, “scholars and policymakers alike have struggled to make sense of the past, present, and future of US-China relations and debated how best to characterise the bilateral relationship”. This concept is crucial in understanding contemporary politics, given the significant divide between Western and Eastern political ideologies. The theory labels political, economic and military advancements as threatening to opposing countries. This is directly related to the military advancements between China and America, both pursuing greater power and security. As a result, even indirectly, the two countries compete militarily, creating opposition and fear. Based on my prior analysis of China and America, it’s important to understand how paranoia can impact global conflict; fear, insecurity and miscalculation all increase the risk of warfare. The theory itself emphasises that the Thucydides trap highlights danger, rather than demonstrating the inevitability of warfare itself: “One important issue for US-Chinese strategic planning is whether China and the United States will allow their political relations to fall into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ (Cimbala 2015, p.14).
Realism emphasises structural pressures and insecurity within international relations; it doesn’t determine outcomes or agency. Realism outlines power transitions that may increase the likelihood of conflict; the outcomes remain dependent on complex strategic and political choices. This emphasises agency and restraint in global politics, stating that risk exists, whereas inevitability does not, and challenges our understanding of the “inevitability” of war between China and the US.
While realism and the Thucydides Trap emphasise the heightened risk during the power transition, it doesn’t render war between China and the US inevitable. Realism emphasises structural pressures and inherent national insecurities but doesn’t determine outcomes. Outcomes of warfare remain contingent on interpretation, decision-making and policies of individual nation-states. From the constructivist perspective, rivalry becomes volatile only when states perceive each other as hostile, a condition apparent in 21st-century US-China relations, and this perspective relates to Thucydides’ Trap. The liberal perspective holds that both China and the US have economic incentives to avoid destabilising international relations, reinforcing restraint, responsibility, and ultimately preservation within a conflict period, with Adams (2018) stating the US is the “inevitable leader of the global system and the guarantor of stability and security” (Adams 2018, p.70).
Conclusion
The US-China conflict, while structurally risky, is not inevitable. Theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism further demonstrate war and its probabilities. These separate theories demonstrate the complexity of the situation, yet each provides a different answer to the inevitability of war. Realism represents the anarchy in international politics whilst placing a strong emphasis on the current power transition. Realism is a powerful international relations theory; it explains conflict through anarchy, power struggles, and the inherent insecurity of nation-states.
Realism further reinforces the Thucydides Trap by demonstrating that fear, insecurity, and miscalculation can have a tremendous impact on global affairs. America had been the lone superpower between 1991 and 2007; China’s rising power, therefore, challenges the current hegemon, further heightening political tensions within Western society. The Thucydides trap also illustrates how economic and military strategies can foster fear between states, heightening the risk of conflict. This ideology has been present for 2,400 years and remains an important theory of potential conflict and why nation-states increase military operations, ultimately explaining why conflict is possible. In contrast, agency and restraint state that nation-states are not forced into war; their leaders make strategic choices through rational decision-making. In this context, deterrence and restraint from conflict matter heavily. This premise eliminates the idea of inevitability, which is heavily emphasised in realism. Sovereign states have the autonomy to make their own strategic decisions.
My constructivist approach clearly outlines that hostility or war is shaped by leaders’ perceptions and identities of the cause. Rivalry is inevitable in international politics and dangerous, but not strictly fixed, as realist views explain. Constructivists argue that conflict isn’t fixed as it is shaped by politics, which can therefore be changed. My understanding is that, from a constructivist perspective, conflict revolves around perceptions, identities, and the social construction of hostility between states. Constructivism deeply strengthens the idea that warfare between the US and China isn’t inherently inevitable, as situations are malleable and can be changed.
Liberalism analyses the nation-state economy, the cost of war and the incentives to manage conflict. The cost of deploying military forces is inherently devastating to a country’s economy. Therefore, it imposes constraints on warfare, demonstrating that strategic decision-making must precede conflict. Liberalism, therefore, demonstrates the external pressures, separate from the rivalry, which must be carefully analysed. These grounds go beyond a constructivist or realist approach, as they analyse the losses or gains a nation-state may incur, adding concrete material issues to the analysis.
In conclusion, competition between the US and China will continue, as both have strong bases in the Asia-Pacific region; there is no “inevitability” of war, as there are several extenuating circumstances and various theories that I have included that debunk the notion of inevitability. War ultimately depends more on political choices than on structure alone; a China-US war would be all-out and involve various political allies. These various political, economic, and military factors have led to outcomes that are highly likely rather than inevitable, according to my extensive research.
References
Adams, G. (2018) ‘U.S. global engagement and the military’, Great Decisions, pp. 69–78. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593698
Cimbala, S.J. (2015) ‘Chinese Military Modernization: Implications for Strategic Nuclear Arms Control’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, 9(2), pp. 11–18. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271072
Winkler, S.C. (2023) ‘Strategic competition and US–China relations: a conceptual analysis’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 16(3), pp. 333–356. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poad008
